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War Powers Resolution 
Michael A. Newton* 
The constitutional infirmity of the War Powers Resolution 
has been uniformly demonstrated by more than four decades of 
bipartisan experience. The Resolution manifestly fails to 
eliminate the healthy inter-branch tensions that are in our 
constitutional DNA with respect to military deployments. In its 
context, the override of President Nixon’s veto represented little 
more than a stark act of congressional opportunism. The 
President’s veto message was prescient in warning that the 
Resolution is “dangerous to the best interests of our Nation.” 
This article suggests that the act represents an attempted 
abdication of the enumerated obligation of Congress to oversee 
military operations via the appropriations power. It describes 
reasons why our republic would be well served by clear-eyed 
reassessment of the War Powers Resolution. It spawned three 
serious defects: 1) it displaced good faith dialogue between the 
co-equal branches with after the fact litigation, 2) it highlights 
American political will as the weakest strand of otherwise 
formidable military capacity, and 3) it creates a perverse 
inventive to reverse engineer military operations based on 
statutory language in ways that undermine strategic objectives. 
American lives and interests are ill-served by these inadvertent 
implications. 
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I. Introduction 
The constitutional infirmity of the War Powers Resolution1 (the 
Resolution) as a statutory straitjacket on executive authority has 
been uniformly demonstrated by more than forty years of practice. 
The Resolution has nonetheless exacerbated three profoundly 
dangerous trends in the context of modern military operations. Since 
its adoption on November 7, 1973, there are few people who have 
criticized that legislation with more insight or persistence than my 
distinguished co-panelist Bob Turner, who has reiterated today his 
verdict that the legislation was a fraud.2 I prefer to view the 
legislative effort to circumscribe the Commander-in-Chief’s 
constitutionally mandated authority as a feckless effort at modern 
constitutional revisionism. Indeed, the inadequacy of the Resolution 
for the purpose sought by its proponents was evident almost from the 
outset. Congressional arguments that the executive power operates 
under the bonds of legislative handcuffs are accordingly misplaced. 
Successive executive branch declarations, most recently President 
Obama’s defense of the use of American power over Libya to aid 
those rebel forces seeking to overcome the tyranny of Muammar 
Qaddafi, make the Resolution itself something of an archaic 
expression of an earlier era of American politics. Implicitly conceding 
their own inability to overthrow the constitutional order, a series of 
bipartisan congressional actions have implicitly reinforced the 
impotence of the Resolution with startling clarity.  
II. Judicial Avoidance of War Powers Issues 
The Article III courts have uniformly elected to remain aloof from 
the legislative-executive struggle. Though this is a subject rich with 
irony and legal nuance, the interests of time permit me to describe 
only three such instances, the legal issues surrounding 1) the NATO 
1. H.R.J. Res. 542, Pub. L. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548). 
2. Robert F. Turner, The War Powers Resolution at 40: Still an 
Unconstitutional, Unnecessary, and Unwise Fraud That Contributed 
Directly to the 9/11 Attacks, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 109 (2012); see 
also ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: 
RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1991). 
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campaign in Kosovo; 2) US military engagement in Kuwait; and 3) 
the policy of targeted bombing under President Clinton.  
The NATO air campaign against the forces of Slobodan Milošević 
began on March 24, 1999 without any formalized expression of 
congressional support and prior to the subsequent action of the UN 
Security Council. As a matter of international law, the Kosovo 
campaign was hotly contested given that it proceeded without either 
Security Council authority or a basis derived from a clear and 
imminent need for national self-defense.3 Following the campaign, the 
Security Council rejected a Russian effort to condemn the campaign 
as a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.4 Furthermore, the 
Council implicitly endorsed the intervention by passing Resolution 
1244 under its Chapter VII powers without expressly commending or 
condemning NATO’s actions.5 On the domestic front, there were 
several votes in Congress during the air campaign and the coordinated 
ground actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army6 that fell short of 
either authorizing an actual deployment of forces or a making a 
3. See Bruno Simma, NATO: the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 
10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (1999) (finding even the mere threat of armed 
intervention to violate the prohibition on the threat or use of force); 
Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria ius Oritur: Are we Moving Towards 
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures 
in the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 23, 29 (1999) (agreeing 
with Professor Simma’s view that the NATO action was contrary to the 
core principles of the UN Charter). 
4. See U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 3989th mtg. at 5–6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3989 
(Mar. 26, 1999) (recording the vote to reject Russia’s draft resolution to 
condemn NATO’s actions by a vote of twelve to three). 
5. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244, (June 10, 1999). Professor 
Thomas Franck analogized this to the refusal to condemn India’s 
violation of Article 2(4) during the intervention in Bangladesh. See 
Thomas M. Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 857, 859 
(1999). 
6. In the interests of full disclosure, the author acknowledges that he was 
in the service of the US government working under the authority of 
Ambassador David Scheffer in the Office of War Crimes Issues, 
Department of State at the time of the Kosovo campaign. In that 
capacity, he helped to prepare the early estimates of missing Kosovar 
Albanian men and document the ongoing atrocities committed by 
Serbian military and paramilitary forces in Kosovo; he coordinated and 
deployed with the FBI into Kosovo to collect the evidence that 
supported the crimes against humanity charges against Milosevic in the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. See DAVID 
SCHEFFER, ALL THE MISSING SOULS 251–95 (2012) (discussing the Kosovo 
conflict in 1998 and 1999 and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’s role in prosecuting those responsible for war 
crimes during the conflict). 
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formal declaration of war.7 The House of Representatives rejected 
such a declaration of war as between United States and Yugoslavia by 
a vote of 2-427.8 During the bombing, Representative Tom Campbell 
(R-CA) along with twenty-five members sought a judicial declaration 
that the actions of the executive violated the Constitution and the 
War Powers Act.9 The District Court for the District of Columbia 
decided that the legislative branch plaintiffs lacked standing due to 
the absence of an actual “constitutional impasse” or attendant “actual 
confrontation” for the bench to resolve.10  
Similarly, in the widely cited case Dellums v. Bush, fifty-four 
members of Congress challenged the authority of President George 
H.W. Bush to order offensive operations to repel the Iraqi aggression 
into Kuwait based on the authority of the Chapter VII Resolution 
alone.11 The case was dismissed as not ripe for judicial determination, 
though Judge Harold H. Greene wrote in dicta that some of the most 
sweeping Justice Department arguments would effectively neuter the 
constitutional authority to “declare war” by turning it into a “merely 
semantic decision” dependent upon the discretion and drafting skill of 
the commander-in-chief and his advisors.12 In language that seems 
strikingly prescient of the Obama Administration’s justifications for 
the use of American air power over Libya during 2011, Judge Greene 
opined that “such an ‘interpretation’ would evade the plain language 
of the Constitution, and it cannot stand.”13 The War Powers 
Resolution and the broader array of congressional-executive 
interactions related to armed hostilities thus remain authoritative 
only as a matter of domestic decision making. The political dynamic 
over the resort to American military power operates irrespective of 
the larger scope of articulable authority derived from international 
legal principles. 
Apart from the series of standing and ripeness determinations, 
courts have commonly avoided constitutional collisions between the 
co-equal branches of the federal power by invoking the political 
7. See JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION 
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 12 (2005). 
8. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30352, WAR 
POWERS LITIGATION INITIATED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SINCE THE 
ENACTMENT OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 8 (2012). 
9. See id.  
10. Campbell v. Clinton, 52 F.Supp.2d 34, 45 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 203 F.2d 
19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
11. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS 171 (2d ed. 2004); Dellums 
v. Bush, 752 F.Supp. 1141, 1143, 1143 n.1 (D.D.C. 1990).  
12. 752 F.Supp. at 1145.  
13. Id. 
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question doctrine. In one of the most pointed invocations of the 
Commander-in-Chief power, President Clinton authorized the 
bombing of targets in Sudan, Iraq, and Afghanistan in response to 
terrorist actions against U.S. interests.14 The Court of Appeals in the 
DC Circuit reiterated in an en banc decision rendered in June 2010, 
that “[u]nder the political question doctrine, the foreign target of a 
military strike cannot challenge in court the wisdom of retaliatory 
military action taken by the United States.”15  
 
III. History the War Powers Resolution and the 
Debate Over Executive Authority 
The history of heated political and legal debates between 
congressional and executive officials has been well summarized in the 
literature, and time does not permit undue regurgitation today. The 
tenor of the political debates and the constitutional passion with 
which they were framed should not in itself be surprising. This 
extensive history itself leads to judicial abstention, despite the 
repeated efforts of congressional leaders to force the federal courts to 
align themselves with legislative branch equities. In the words of the 
El-Shifa majority: 
By asserting the authority to decide questions the Constitution 
reserves to Congress and the Executive, some would expand 
judicial power at the expense of the democratically elected 
branches. And by stretching beyond all precedent the limited 
category of claims so frivolous as not to involve a federal 
question, all would permit courts to decide the merits of 
disputes under the guise of a jurisdictional holding while 
sidestepping obstacles that are truly jurisdictional.16  
The War Powers Resolution fails in the first instance on that level 
alone, as it seeks to eliminate the healthy inter-branch tensions and 
debates that should guide the use of American power. The “Purpose 
and Policy” section states that: 
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, 
or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
14. Michele L. Malvesti, Bombing bin Laden: Assessing the Effectiveness of 
Air Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., 
Winter-Spring 2002, at 18–19.  
15. El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 851 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
16. Id. at 850–51. 
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clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only 
pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory 
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack 
upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its 
armed forces.17  
Section 4(a) further requires the president to submit a report, 
within forty-eight hours of introducing U.S. Armed Forces into 
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities 
is clearly indicated by the circumstances, to the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives and to the president pro tempore of the Senate.18 
The report must provide the circumstances necessitating the 
introduction of such forces, the constitutional and legislative authority 
under which such introduction took place, and the estimated scope 
and duration of the hostilities or involvement.19 Section 5(b) requires 
the president, within sixty calendar days of submitting such report, to 
terminate any use of the U.S. Armed Forces unless Congress takes 
certain enumerated actions to authorize continuing combat or “is 
physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the 
United States.”20 The sixty-day period, however, may be extended to 
ninety days if the president certifies to Congress that “unavoidable 
military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces 
requires the continued use of such armed forces in bringing about a 
prompt removal of such forces.”21 “Thus, when a report under section 
4(a)(1) is filed . . . section 5(b)’s 60 day (or, when appropriate, 90 
day) ‘clock’ begins to run.”22  
Perhaps the gravest obligation of the chief executive is that of 
keeping the nation safe from its enemies. The burden of watching 
American families sacrifice themselves pursuant to the orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief means that decisions to employ American 
military power can never be lightly undertaken. There must in turn 
be a tight nexus between the force employed and the principles that 
guide that use of force and the larger strategic imperatives. The 
essence of America is embodied in her sons and daughters, and the 
profound decisions to use force affect the life of the nation as well as 
17. Pub. L. No. 93-148, §2(a), 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
1541(c)) (emphasis added). 
18. Id. § 4(a)(1)–(3) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(3)). 
19. Id. § 4(a)(3). 
20. Id. § 5(b) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)). 
21. Id. 
22. Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Ass’t Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to the Att’y Gen., Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in 
Kosovo (Dec. 19, 2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/final.h 
tm.  
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the lives and safety of those young Americans. This is the essence of 
what it means to have created a constitutional republic in which the 
authority of the executive derives from the consent of the governed. 
Conflicting cross-currents of debate between the president and 
Congress over the use of force national identity are in our very 
national DNA. All American wars have had an inevitable political 
linkage. Heated disagreements over the proper scope and use of 
American military accordingly date to our earliest national 
experiences.23  
The original impulse of the War Powers Resolution might have 
been admirable, though there is ample evidence that it actually 
represented an act of stark congressional opportunism. Prior to the 
override of President Nixon’s veto on November 7, 1973, the 93rd 
Congress had failed in eight previous veto override attempts.24 Quite 
apart from the ultimately mortal wound to the Nixon presidency 
occasioned by Watergate, the War Powers Resolution came in the 
context of a tumultuous period of American political life. The massed 
armies of Arab states, led by Syria, attacked Israel on October 6th, 
and the Yom Kippur War ended on October 25th, the day after 
President Nixon’s veto of the War Powers Resolution.25 Vice 
President Spiro T. Agnew had resigned on October 10th, after being 
charged with having accepted more than $100,000 in bribes while 
serving in a succession of public offices.26 The Arab oil embargo began 
on October 19th, and the economic attrition was just beginning to 
bite the nation.27 The incident we now remember as the “Saturday 
Night Massacre” took place on October 20th, as President Nixon fired 
Archibald Cox, the Justice Department special prosecutor for 
Watergate, and abolished the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which 
23. See generally Alexander Hamilton & James Madison, The Pacificus-
Helvidius Debate, GAZETTE OF THE U.S., June 29, 1793, available at 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?documentprint=4
29. 
24. See Louis Fisher & David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolution: 
Time to Say Goodbye, 113 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 4 (1998). 
25. See Veto of the War Powers Resolution, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4021 (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2013). 
26. See Letter from House Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford to President 
Richard M. Nixon, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/educat 
ion/lessons/ford-nixon-letter/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
27. See James C. McMillin, Principled Fairness in the Regulation of 
Petroleum Prices, 57 TEX. L. REV. 573, 577 (1979) (discussing the 1973 
Arab oil embargo). 
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in turn prompted the resignation of the Attorney General, Elliott 
Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus.28  
The pressure for presidential impeachment was palpably building. 
The veto of the War Powers Resolution just four days after the 
Saturday Night Massacre presented a tempting target against a 
weakened president. At the same time, the papers were full of 
accounts that President Nixon had total income of nearly $800,000 for 
tax years 1970, 1971, and 1972 but had paid only some $5,000 in 
combined federal taxes.29 The tax revelations would ultimately 
prompt perhaps the most memorable public statement of Nixon’s long 
career as he held a press conference on November 17, 1973 to 
proclaim: “Well, I’m not a crook. I’ve earned everything I’ve got.”30 
Public opinion polls of the time showed that 76% of those asked had a 
negative impression of President Nixon’s ability to “inspire confidence 
personally in the White House.”31 Some 83% of the American people 
rated the President negatively for his “handling of the Watergate 
case” according to the Harris Survey.32 Is it any wonder that a 
number of legislators reversed their votes on the War Powers 
Resolution to override President Nixon’s veto? What other issue in 
American political life has since managed to unite more than 80% of 
the vox populi? Would anyone have expected the 93rd Congress to 
align itself with the executive interests of an increasingly unpopular 
administration, in the midst of the oil shock and an increasingly 
fearful public?  
Setting aside the unique political confluence that produced the 
congressional override of President Nixon’s veto, the focus of this 
essay is my firm conviction that the larger interests of our republic 
would be well served by a clear-eyed reassessment of the actual 
implementation and effects of the War Powers Resolution. The phrase 
“repeal and replace” is a commonly voiced sentiment in our political 
discourse, albeit in a wholly distinct context from the war powers 
debate. President Nixon’s veto message from October 24, 1973 
28. See Rex VanMiddlesworth, Archibald Cox: Conscience of a Nation, 61 
TEX. B.J. 84, 84 (1998); Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Faces Firing of Cox; 
Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1973, http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/ 
articles/102173-2.htm. 
29. See A Portrait of a Country Awash in ‘Red Ink,’ NPR (July 30, 2012), 
http://m.npr.org/story/157449392. 
30. See Richard Nixon, “I’m Not a Crook,” YOUTUBE (July 15, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sh163n1lJ4M. 
31. Nixon Tumbles to New Low in Confidence Poll, NASHUA TELEGRAPH, 
Mar. 17, 1971, at 18. 
32. See The Watergate Files, GERALD R. FORD LIBR. & MUSEUM, 
http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/museum/exhibits/watergate_files/c
ontent.php?section=3&page=d (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
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categorically declared that the act infringed executive authority in 
ways that would be “both unconstitutional and dangerous to the best 
interests of our Nation.”33 Experience bears out his prediction in ways 
that were unforeseen at the time. After nearly forty years, real 
reevaluation would be appropriate given the context of modern 
conflicts and in light of technological innovation. On a perhaps more 
poignant level, the War Powers Resolution has had profoundly 
dangerous effects on the conduct of American military operations. 
American lives and interests are ill-served by its inadvertent 
implications.  
Before focusing on three distinct dimensions of these dangerous 
trends, we should frame our reassessment of the War Powers 
Resolution against a couple of bedrock truths. In the first place, no 
one should cavalierly disregard the context of the American 
constitutional ferment at the time of the framers and the subsequent 
ratification debates. We’ve grown so accustomed to the trappings of 
our federal republic that we forget that there was vigorous debate in 
the Constitutional Convention whether the executive power should be 
vested in either a singular or plural executive. These lengthy debates 
originated from a visceral rejection of a monarchical power, which was 
the defining imperative that shaped American perceptions at the time. 
The shift towards rejection of the person and power of the King of 
33. Veto of the War Powers Resolution, supra note 25. Nixon’s veto 
message began: 
While I am in accord with the desire of the Congress to assert 
its proper role in the conduct of our foreign affairs, the 
restrictions which this resolution would impose upon the 
authority of the President are both unconstitutional and 
dangerous to the best interests of our Nation. 
 
The proper roles of the Congress and the Executive in the 
conduct of foreign affairs have been debated since the founding 
of our country. Only recently, however, has there been a serious 
challenge to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in choosing not 
to draw a precise and detailed line of demarcation between the 
foreign policy powers of the two branches. 
 
The Founding Fathers understood the impossibility of foreseeing 
every contingency that might arise in this complex area. They 
acknowledged the need for flexibility in responding to changing 
circumstances. They recognized that foreign policy decisions 
must be made through close cooperation between the two 
branches and not through rigidly codified procedures. 
 
These principles remain as valid today as they were when our 
Constitution was written. Yet House Joint Resolution 542 would 
violate those principles by defining the President’s powers in 
ways which would strictly limit his constitutional authority. 
 Id.  
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England marked the decisive turning point of the American struggle 
for independence.34 George Washington recognized that focusing the 
energy of the army on the king as the enemy who must be overcome 
in order to achieve the cause of American independence was 
profoundly cathartic to the military effort. In order to sustain morale 
and a sense of mission, he ordered that the pamphlet Common Sense 
by Thomas Paine be distributed to the troops.35 
Against the backdrop of continental rejection of the monarchy as 
a governing institution, Benjamin Franklin, among others, voiced 
concerns that a singular executive could readily arrogate power as 
against the legislative branch and become overambitious or, in his 
words, “fond of war.”36 The disagreement over the identity of the 
chief executive was amplified by the reality that any federal standing 
army would be under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. 
Delegates rejected efforts to give Congress a role in the conduct of 
hostilities. Article I accordingly gives Congress the authority only to 
“declare war” as delegates unanimously rejected a role for 
congressional authority to “make war.”37 This must have relieved 
General Washington greatly as he knew better than anyone the 
grievous effects of congressional management of the Revolution.38 The 
debate over a singular Commander-in-Chief would have been 
particularly uncomfortable to General Washington who reportedly sat 
with composure and stoic character throughout the discussion.39 In 
the draft of Washington’s first inaugural address, there is some 
evidence that he remained troubled by the presumed aspersions upon 
the character of the chief executive. In his draft text (which was 
amended prior to the actual public speech), he wrote that:  
34. See SCOTT LIELL, 46 PAGES THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE, AND THE 
TURNING POINT TO AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 16–21 (2003).  
35. Id. at 125. 
36. CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT PHILADELPHIA: THE STORY OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 60 
(1986). 
37. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
38. See CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE 
CONTINENTAL ARMY AND AMERICAN CHARACTER 1775–1783, at 64–65 
(1979) (stating that Congress repeatedly refused Washington’s and other 
generals’ requests to increase enlistment service for militia men or to 
provide bounty incentive to increase the length of service, and to move 
from a militia to a Continental army). 
39. See Richard J. Behn, The Dignity of Leadership from Washington to 
Lincoln, THE LEHRMAN INSTIT., http://lehrmaninstitute.org/history/the-
dignity-of-leadership-from-washington-to-lincoln.asp (last visited Feb. 
16, 2013) (“Washington’s stoic and modest dignity was essential to the 
trust that the Second Continental Congress placed in him in 1775 when 
they selected him to command the Continental Army.”). 
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[I]f there should be a single citizen of the United States, to 
whom the tenour of my life is so little known, that he could 
imagine me capable of being so smitten with the allurements of 
sensual gratification, the frivolities of ceremony or the baubles 
of ambition, as to be induced from such motives to accept a 
public appointment: I shall only lament his imperfect 
acquaintance with my heart, and leave him until another 
retirement (should Heaven spare my life for a little space) shall 
work a conviction.40 
The second conceptual underpinning of the War Powers 
Resolution was the deep-seated colonial reluctance to envision a 
sweeping executive branch authority paired with a permanent 
standing army. Writing as “Centinel” in the Philadelphia Freeman’s 
Journal of October 24, 1787, Samuel Bryan opined that:  
A standing army with regular provision of pay and 
contingencies, would afford a strong temptation to some 
ambitious man to step up into the throne, and to seize absolute 
power. The keeping on foot a hired military force in time of 
peace ought not to be gone into unless two thirds of the 
members of the legislature agree.41 
In a similar cautionary vein, other anti-federalists wrote in the 
New York Journal that “keeping up a standing army, would be the 
highest degree dangerous to the liberty and happiness of the 
community . . . no government should be empowered to do that 
which if done, would tend to destroy public liberty.”42 The framers 
addressed these vehement objections by giving an express and 
delimited power to the legislative branch. Article 1, section 8 of the 
Constitution expressly provides congressional authority to “raise and 
support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be 
for a longer Term than two Years.”43 No less an authority than 
Alexander Hamilton later argued that this limitation provided “a 
precaution which, upon a nearer view of it, will appear to be a great 
and real security against the keeping up of troops without evident 
40. George Washington, Fragments of a Draft of the First Inaugural 
Address, in WRITINGS 705 (John Rhodehamel ed., 1997). 
41. “Centinel” II, To Avoid the Usual Fate of Nations: Reply to Wilson’s 
Speech, FREEMAN’S J., Oct. 24, 1787, reprinted in THE DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, 
AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE FOR RATIFICATION, PART ONE 85 
(1993) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION]. 
42. “Brutus” VIII, On the Calamity of a National Debt that Cannot Be 
Repaid, and On Standing Armies, N.Y. J., Jan. 10, 1788, reprinted in 
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 41, at 736. 
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.  
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necessity.”44 In Hamilton’s opinion, seemingly ubiquitous among the 
Federalist camp, vesting the exclusive power of raising and supporting 
military forces in the popularly elected legislative branch would be the 
surest check upon the power of an otherwise overweening chief 
executive bent on committing the republic to military adventures. 
Thus, in the words of a leading Federalist writer during the debates 
over ratification the “representatives of the people have it in their 
power to disband th[e] army every two years, by refusing supplies.”45  
The Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has 
argued that the War Powers Resolution was enacted against a 
background that was “replete with instances of presidential uses of 
military force abroad in the absence of prior congressional approval.”46 
It further distinguished the types of conflicts the act was intended for, 
reasoning that Congress’ overriding interest was to prevent the 
United States from being engaged, without express congressional 
authorization, in “major, prolonged conflicts such as the wars in 
Vietnam and Korea, rather than to prohibit the President from using 
or threatening to use troops to achieve important diplomatic 
objectives where the risk of sustained military conflict was 
negligible.”47 In Crockett v. Reagan, Judge Joyce Hens Green 
concluded “the automatic cutoff after 60 days was intended to place 
the burden on the President to seek positive approval from the 
Congress, rather than to require the Congress positively to disapprove 
the action, which had proven so politically difficult during the 
Vietnam war.”48 These arguments are misplaced in the sense that the 
very raison d’etre of the congressional appropriations power, with 
respect to the armed forces, was to “frustrate presidential warmaking 
that was not in the nation’s interests.”49  
The very constitutional infirmity of the War Powers Resolution is 
thus embedded into its structure because it purported to shift the 
burden from congressional exercise of express constitutional powers to 
achieve the very purpose envisioned when the framers crafted the 
appropriations power. Such an abdication of wholly appropriate 
44. “Publius,” The Danger of a Standing Army: “An Intention to Mislead 
the People,” INDEP. J., Dec. 19, 1787, reprinted in DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 41, at 576. 
45. Rebuttal to “An Officer of the Late Continental Army”: “Plain Truth,” 
INDEP. GAZETTEER, Nov. 10, 1787, reprinted in DEBATE ON THE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 41, at 109. 
46. Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad Without Statutory 
Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. 185, 187 (1980).  
47. Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
173, 175 (1994).  
48. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 899 (D.D.C. 1982)).  
49. YOO, supra note 7, at 160. 
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legislative oversight of operations cannot be remedied by the 
statutory device designed to shift responsibility onto the Commander-
in-Chief absent an affirmative act by Congress. The inconsistency 
between the design of Article 8 and the text of the War Powers 
Resolution is perhaps the primary driver for the uniform disregard of 
its mandates by both the executive and legislative branches. In other 
words, the War Powers Resolution, since the very day of its 
enactment, has demonstrated the invalidity of congressional 
arguments that the executive power operates under the bonds of 
statutory handcuffs.  
IV. Ramifications of the War Powers Resolution 
There are, nevertheless, at least three inadvertent ramifications of 
the War Powers Resolution that have become apparent after forty 
years of practice. The irony is that while the framers clearly 
envisioned a legislative role in the employment of American military 
power, the very effectiveness of American power has been undermined 
by the War Powers Resolution through which the 93rd Congress 
purportedly attempted to enshrine just such congressional oversight 
and inter-branch consultation. The three most consequential 
inadvertent implications of the Resolution are discussed below.  
A. President as Litigator-in-Chief 
First, debates over the applicability of the War Powers Resolution 
have shifted the attention from the proper role of the president as the 
national leader to that of the national litigator-in-chief. The 
interpretation guidance to the War Powers Resolution states that the 
Resolution should not be “construed as granting any authority to the 
President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed 
Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in 
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”50 But this 
assumes that the president already has such authority, and that the 
Resolution is not “intended to alter the constitutional authority of the 
. . . President.”51 Additionally, although the text makes plain that, 
even in the absence of specific authorization from Congress, the 
President may introduce armed forces into hostilities only in “a 
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its 
territories or possessions, or its armed forces,” every lucid observer 
concedes that this declaration, found in the Purpose and Policy 
section, either is incomplete or is not meant to be binding.52 The War 
50. 50 U.S.C. § 1547(d)(2) (2012). 
51. Id. § 1547(d)(1); Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 
18 Op. O.L.C. at 176. 
52. Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C., 
at 176 (quoting Cyrus R. Vance, Striking the Balance: Congress and the 
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Powers Resolution effectively marginalized the congressional role to 
carping from the sidelines as various presidents have launched an 
increasingly diverse range of military operations.  
After forty-years practice, there is a long line of precedent that 
has stretched the bounds of executive power in ways that could 
scarcely have been imagined by the framers. For example, the OLC 
opinion for the use of force in Somalia in 1992 reasoned that, 
“Attorneys General and this Office have concluded that the President 
has the power to commit United States troops abroad as well as to 
take military action, for the purpose of protecting important national 
interests,” even without specific prior authorization from Congress.53 
Just two years later, the OLC echoed its’ reasoning in the deployment 
of armed forces into Haiti.54 The “pattern of executive conduct, made 
under claim of right, extended over many decades and engaged in by 
Presidents of both parties, ‘evidences the existence of broad 
constitutional power.’”55 The independent authority of the executive 
derives from the president’s unique responsibility, as Commander-in-
Chief and chief executive for foreign and military affairs as well as 
national security.56 The OLC used similar reasoning once again in 
1995 in relation to the proposed deployment into Bosnia.57 It 
explained that the scope and limits of the congressional power to 
declare war is not well defined by constitutional text, case law, or 
statute, but rather, the relationship of Congress’ power to declare war 
and the president’s authority as Commander-in-Chief and chief 
executive has been clarified by two-hundred years of practice.58  
President Under the War Powers Resolution, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 81 
(1984)). 
53. Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. 
O.L.C. 6, 6 (1992). 
54. Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. at 
178. 
55. Id. (quoting Presidential Power to Use the Armed Forces Abroad 
Without Statutory Authorization, 4A Op. O.L.C. at 187).  
56. See Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. 
O.L.C., at 176 n.4 (citing Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 266 
(1909) and The Thomas Gibbons, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 421, 427–28 
(1814)); see also id. at 178 (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763, 789 (1950)).  
57. Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 
Op. O.L.C. 327, 333 (1995). 
58. See id. at 330−31; see also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR 70–71 (1990) (noting how historical precedent serves as “quasi-
constitutional custom” in foreign affairs). 
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This frame of reasoning is uniformly supported by the judiciary, 
including the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in 
Dames & Moore v. Regan:  
[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . 
may be treated as a gloss on “Executive Power” vested in the 
President by §1 of Article II. Past practice does not, by itself, 
create power, but long-continued practice, known to and 
acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the 
[action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent[.]59  
In Haig v. Agee, Chief Justice Burger further reasoned that the 
historical practice reflects the two political branches’ practical 
understanding, developed since the founding of the republic, of their 
respective roles and responsibilities with respect to national defense.60 
Jack Goldsmith, who admirably delivered the keynote address earlier 
this morning, described this reasoning as simply a principle of 
constitutional law—”that a constitutional meaning may be liquidated 
by constitutional practice.”61 Professor Goldsmith argued that 
Congress had known about the pattern of presidential unilateralism 
for decades and done little in response. Congress has never seriously 
questioned the use of overseas military power without its 
authorization, much less impeached a president for authorizing such 
force. Instead, a succession of bipartisan legislatures has financed an 
enormous military force in the face of this continuing practice and has 
consistently refused to withhold funding for a wide array of 
deployments. The net effect of this practice has been to immunize the 
president from oversight. Hence, presidents of both parties are in an 
almost unassailably strong litigation posture vis-á-vis Congress, and 
they know it.  
The War Powers Resolution has therefore had the paradoxical 
effect of displacing good faith debate and dialogue between the 
branches with after-the-fact litigation. Presidents of both parties have 
felt confident that courts would support their executive prerogatives, 
and the War Powers Resolution has had the unfortunate effect of 
creating the perception that the constitutional authority is subject to 
distributive bargaining between the executive and legislative 
branches. Thus, presidents have relied upon their inherent 
59. Dames v. Moore, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
60. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291–92 (1981). 
61. Jack Goldsmith, War Power, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2011, 6:48 PM), http:// 
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/03/war
_power.html.  
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constitutional authority, secure in the belief that the war-making 
function is not a zero sum game. In the process, there has been a 
tendency to rely upon successful litigation strategies rather than a 
clearly presented framing of the national objectives at stake in a given 
deployment or a clear-eyed national discussion of the merits of such 
overseas action. 
B. US Enemies’ Ability to Manipulate American Political Will 
The corollary to this modern reality, and the second of three 
inadvertent implications of the Resolution, is that our enemies now 
focus on American political will as the Achilles heel of our vast 
capabilities. Prior to the War Powers Resolution, President 
Eisenhower understood that it was necessary to “seek the cooperation 
of the Congress. Only with that can we give the reassurance needed 
to deter aggression.”62 President Clinton understood the importance of 
clear communication with the Congress and the American people in 
order to sustain the political legitimacy that is a vital element of 
modern military operations. Justifying his bombing of targets in 
Sudan, he argued that the “risks from inaction, to America and the 
world, would be far greater than action, for that would embolden our 
enemies, leaving their ability and their willingness to strike us 
intact.”63 In his letter to Congress “consistent with the War Powers 
Resolution,” the president reported that the strikes “were a necessary 
and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist 
attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities” and “were intended to 
prevent and deter additional attacks by a clearly identified terrorist 
threat.”64 The following day, in a radio address to the nation, the 
president explained his decision to take military action, stating, “Our 
goals were to disrupt bin Laden’s terrorist network and destroy 
elements of its infrastructure in Afghanistan and Sudan. And our goal 
was to destroy, in Sudan, the factory with which bin Laden’s network 
is associated, which was producing an ingredient essential for nerve 
62. See Louis Fisher, Presidential Power in National Security: A Guide to 
the President-Elect, in WHITE HOUSE TRANSITION PROJECT REPORTS 11 
(2007). See also FISHER, supra note 11, at 124–25 (noting that 
Eisenhower understood the independence of executive and the 
interdependence as a pragmatic matter for funding and political 
expediency, yet still sent troops to Lebanon and began US involvement 
in Vietnam). 
63. President William J. Clinton, Address to the Nation on Military Action 
Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, in II PUB. PAPERS 
1460, 1461 (1998). 
64. President William J. Clinton, Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting 
on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in Afghanistan and Sudan, in 
II PUB. PAPERS 1464, 1464 (1998). 
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gas.”65 Citing “compelling evidence that the bin Laden network was 
poised to strike at us again” and was seeking to acquire chemical 
weapons, the president declared that we simply could not ignore the 
threat posed, and hence ordered the strikes.66 Similarly, President 
Clinton understood that intervention in Bosnia could not be 
successful absent some national consensus, which had been slow to 
form during the long Bosnian civil war.67 
Secretary of State George Schultz provided perhaps the most 
poignant and pointed example of this truism in his testimony to 
Congress regarding the deployment of US Marines into Lebanon to 
separate the warring factions in 1982. On September 21, 1983, he 
testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and provided 
a chilling premonition of the bombing that would come only one 
month later and kill 241 Americans, which was the bloodiest day in 
the Marine Corps since the battle of Iwo Jima.68 Seeking to bolster 
legislative support and to better explain the strategic objectives, he 
explained that: 
It is not the mission of our marines or of the [Multinational 
Force in Lebanon] as a whole to maintain the military balance 
in Lebanon by themselves. Nevertheless, their presence remains 
one crucial pillar of the structure of stability. They are an 
important deterrent, a symbol of the international backing 
behind the legitimate Government of Lebanon, and an 
important weight in the scales.  
To remove the marines would put both the Government and 
what we are trying to achieve in jeopardy. This is why our 
domestic controversy over the war powers has been so 
disturbing. Uncertainty about the American commitment can 
only weaken our effectiveness. Doubts about our staying power 
can only cause political aggressors to discount our presence or to 
intensify their attacks in hopes of hastening our departure.  
65. President William J. Clinton, The President’s Radio Address, in II PUB. 
PAPERS 1464, 1465 (1998). 
66. Id. 
67. See Bob Dole, Balkans Require Bipartisanship, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 
2001, at A10 (noting that although “a strong bipartisan consensus on 
Bosnia policy existed in Congress for most of the first half and much of 
the second half of the Clinton administration,” the inaction of the first 
half of Clinton’s administration cost the Bosnian population dearly).  
68. See Pres. Ronald Reagan, Proclamation 5396˗A Time of Remembrance, 
1985, in II Pub. Papers 1283, 1283 (1985). 
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An accommodation between the President and Congress to 
resolve this dispute will help dispel those doubts about our 
staying power and strengthen our political hand.69 
Following the spectacularly successful terrorist attack on the 
Marine barracks in Beirut, President Reagan withdrew the Marines. 
Osama bin Laden later cited this as an example of American weakness 
that could not withstand the jihadist fury he sought.70 
The legal battles over the scope and effect of the War Powers 
Resolution have highlighted the focus on national political will as the 
fulcrum of successful military operations by requiring assurances that 
military operations are limited in nature, duration, and scope, and 
therefore well within the president’s constitutional authority as 
Commander-in-Chief and chief executive. President Obama’s report to 
Congress in the context of the Libya operations in 2011 cited 
precedent from air strikes in Bosnia that took just over two weeks 
and involved more than 2,300 US sorties and the deployment of US 
forces in Somalia in 1992 and Haiti in 1993.71 The White House 
released a memorandum from the OLC, similar to previous 
interventions, explaining how the authorization to use such force was 
constitutional on the basis that “‘war’ within the meaning of the 
[Constitution’s] Declaration of War Clause” does not encompass all 
military engagements, but only those that are “prolonged and 
substantial . . . typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel 
to significant risk over a substantial period.”72 President Obama 
consistently maintained that the US role in Libya was limited, 
unlikely to expose any US persons to attack (especially given the role 
of missiles and drones and the utter inability of Qaddafi’s forces to 
strike back with conventional means), and likely to end 
expeditiously.73 By that logic, it did not require authorization from 
69. War Powers Resolution: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Rel., 
98th Cong. 1 (1983) (statement of Hon. George P. Shultz, Sec’y of 
State). 
70. See Osama Bin Laden, Bin Laden’s Fatwa, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 23, 
1996),jhttp://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military/july-dec96/ 
fatwa_1996.html?print (explaining Bin Laden’s comments about the 
Beirut massacre). 
71. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8–9 (2011).  
72. Id. at 8.  
73. See id. In the Pentagon, the legal opinion of whether we were at war 
with Libya for purposes of the War Powers Resolution, and more 
specifically, for purposes of the termination clause, certainly did not 
seem to be an opinion one was open to give, perhaps knowing it did not 
coincide with others in the administration. Then Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates was asked in an ABC News interview on March 27, 
whether Libya posed an actual or imminent threat to the United States. 
Gates responded quite simply, “no.” He explained that although Libya 
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Congress. The administration ultimately adopted a legal analysis that 
the US military’s activities fell short of “hostilities,” and thus, the 
president needed no permission from Congress to continue the mission 
after the expiration of the sixty-day reporting window specified in the 
War Powers Resolution.74 The president’s reasoning rested on 
previous OLC opinions that what counts as war depends on “a fact- 
specific assessment of the ‘anticipated nature, scope, and duration’ of 
the planned military operations.”75  
Present justifications for bypassing the War Powers Resolution 
hinge on interpretations that it requires “prolonged and substantial 
military engagements, typically involving exposure of U.S. military 
personnel to significant risk over a substantial period.”76 The OLC 
engaged in similar reasoning in the Bosnia intervention in 1995, 
explaining that in deciding whether the proposed deployment into 
Bosnia amounted to a “‘war’ in the constitutional sense, considerable 
weight was given to the consensual nature and protective purposes of 
the operation.”77 That deployment was similarly intended to be a 
limited mission but that mission, in contrast to the present one, was 
in support of an agreement that the warring parties had reached and 
it was at the invitation of the parties that led to the belief that little 
or no resistance to the deployment would occur. Though some 
scholars argued that the Libya OLC Memorandum defended its 
reasoning for why the operation did not amount to “war,” it did not 
address whether the administration believed that it will have to stop 
was a national interest to the United States, it was not a vital one. 
Interview by Jake Tapper, ABC News, with Defense Sec’y Robert Gates 
and Sec’y of State Hillary Clinton (Mar. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4800. 
Similarly, a few months later, as the sixty-day clock neared expiration, 
the question of whether we were at war with Libya was increasingly 
more important and controversial. Jeh Johnson, the Pentagon General 
Counsel similarly told the White House he believed that the United 
States military’s activities in the NATO-led air war amounted to 
“hostilities.” Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War 
Power, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 18, 2011, at A1. 
74. See Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing 
U.S. Role in Libya Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011, at A16. 
75. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. at 8 (quoting 
Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 
173, 179 (1994)). 
76. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. at 8.  
77. Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 
Op. O.L.C. 327, 333 (1995). 
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operations upon expiration of the sixty-ninety-day clock under the 
War Powers Resolution.78 The deadline passed with little fanfare.  
The memorandum also relied upon quite distinguishable precedent 
to serve as a guiding point in this intervention. Professor Goldsmith 
argued the opinion broke “new ground . . . in its extension of the ‘no 
war’ precedents beyond the Bosnia and Haiti situations—which 
involved consensual peacekeeping-like introductions of ground troops 
but no significant uses of force—to cover two weeks of non-consensual 
aerial bombardments.”79 Thus, even as it incentivizes short term, 
limited deployments, the War Powers Resolution embeds an 
inevitable constitutional collision between the coordinate branches. 
Our enemies can rely upon constitutional carping from Congress, and 
in fact can adapt tactics and statements that seek to undermine 
political will in the US Congress and among the American people 
from the first days of an operation. The Resolution helps to ensure 
that such debates over the national political will take center stage 
sooner rather than later, and an asymmetric enemy can in theory 
erode our political will even before it solidifies. 
C. Restrictive Rules of Engagement at the Expense of Achieving   
Strategic Objective 
Finally, the War Powers Resolution has the pernicious effect of 
incentivizing commanders to adopt a form of reverse engineering in 
the planning and conduct of operations. The effort to limit casualties 
and designed to create minimal risk relies on previous OLC reasoning 
that such operations would comply with the statutory mandate.80 As 
noted above, commanders-in-chief must ensure that there is a tight 
nexus between the strategic reason for ordering deployments of US 
forces and the optimal conduct of hostilities to secure those objectives 
quickly and with the least possible expenditure in terms of blood and 
treasure.  
As Private Eddie DiFranco stood guard in front of the Marine 
Barracks that October morning in Beirut in 1983, he was under strict 
Rules of Engagement that prohibited him from chambering a live 
round in his weapon.81 The Sergeant of the Guard, Stephen Russell, 
78. See Robert Chesney, A Point-by-Point of Libya’s OLC Memo, LAWFARE 
(Apr. 7, 2011, 4:15 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/04/a-point-
by-point-summary-of-olcs-libya-memo/. 
79. Jack Goldsmith, Office of Legal Counsel Opinion on Libya Intervention, 
LAWFARE (Apr. 7, 2011, 1:32 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011 
/04/office-of-legal-counsel-opinion-on-libya-intervention.  
80. Proposed Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Bosnia, 19 
Op. O.L.C. at 332. 
81. JOHN C. O’BRIEN, FORCE PROTECTION: FROM BEIRUT TO KHOBAR 
TOWERS, WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED (1998).  
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remembers the yellow Mercedes truck that sped by on its way to kill 
241 Americans.82 He recalls that the driver smiled at him as he drove 
past the guard who was too slow to react.83 Even as crews cleared the 
rubble from the bombing, marines posted a chilling cartoon on a 
bulletin board. The cartoon undoubtedly captures the view some 
soldiers have of ROE in the era of the War Powers Resolution—it 
showed a Marine rifleman in a prone firing position behind a 
barricade in Lebanon.84 The president of the United States is shown 
whispering in his ear, “Before you fire, I want you to consider the 
nuances of the War Powers Act.”85 
To be sure, the War Powers Resolution coincided with a set of 
revolutionary changes in the nature of warfare, the abolition of the 
national draft, and the transition to an all-volunteer force, and 
epochal changes in the nature of conflict as new non-state actors 
became the norm. It is also historically clear that the micro-
management of conflict did predate the War Powers Resolution in 
some circumstances. One need only remember President Johnson 
helping to select targets in Vietnam for instance.86 It is difficult to 
pinpoint a causal linkage between the Resolution and the dramatically 
more restrictive conduct of modern operations. However, the passage 
of the War Powers Resolution most definitely injected an entirely 
unhealthy degree of politicization into the war-making function. 
Though it was intended to reinforce the parallel authorities of the co-
equal branches of the federal government, it actually embedded great 
incentives for commanders to issue restrictive rules of engagement in 
an overall effort to limit casualties, as well as the scope of the conflict.  
This domestic political restriction created controversy for example 
during the Kosovo air campaign between the United States and its 
NATO allies. Of more fundamental concern to the war-fighters and 
the lawyers that advise them, artificial rules that go well beyond the 
normal bounds of the laws and customs of warfare logically lead to 
increased American casualties as they erode the morale of the force. 
To the extent that the War Powers Resolution helped to inject 
political sensitivity into the conduct of operations, it has led to 
constrained rules that may not be the optimal pathway for achieving 
US strategic objectives. Constrained rules in turn actually make 
82. Rick Hampson, Haunting Memories of the Blast that Shook the World, 
USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2008, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/ 
military/2008-10-15-beirut-barracks_N.htm.  
83. Id.  
84. See Mark S. Martins, Rule of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of 
Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1994). 
85. Id.  
86. See Tom Wicker, In the Nation: Ghosts of Vietnam, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 1991, § 1. 
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missions longer and more costly. This is not at all of course to imply 
that there are inherent limits on the commander-in-chief’s war-making 
authority, but to the extent that the Resolution embeds artificial 
barriers to the accomplishment of US military objectives, it artificially 
impedes US success in ways that its drafters would certainly not have 
foreseen or sought.  
V. Conclusion 
The War Powers Resolution is an outdated and demonstrably 
irrelevant relic of a bygone era of American political life. Its vestigial 
remains nevertheless result in heated debates between the coordinate 
branches of the federal government. This is especially true in the 
modern era of uncertainty regarding the precise scope of international 
authority for the use of force. At the time of this writing, debate 
continues over the adoption of the crime of aggression in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. Current texts require 
that trans-state aggression must be “manifest” in order to warrant 
criminal sanction.87 The function of the threshold is twofold. First, it 
implies a magnitude test by referring to the gravity and scale of the 
act of aggression. Second, by referring to the character, the threshold 
poses a qualitative requirement: the state use of force must be 
unambiguously illegal. This qualitative aspect is very important 
because there has been extensive debate on whether Article 2(4) of 
the UN Charter is dead or useless because of its complete 
indeterminacy.88 The prohibition arising from international law on the 
use of force is surrounded by a legal grey area of some significance. 
The scope of anticipatory self-defense and forcible rescue operations at 
this juncture as well as some forms of humanitarian intervention 
remain defensible but unclear under international law.89 
In all those cases, reasonable international lawyers may disagree 
about the current state of the law. It would be thoroughly unwise to 
87. Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(1), July 17, 
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
88. For two of the most important voices, see Thomas M. Franck, Who 
Killed Art. 2(4)? or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by 
States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (1970) and Michael J. Glennon, The Fog 
of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 540 (2002). 
See also Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 
939 (2005). For Glennon’s unsurprisingly skeptical conclusions 
concerning the crime of aggression, see Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-
Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 71 (2009).  
89. For a more comprehensive (and at the same time masterfully succinct) 
exposition of this grey area, see Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Aggression, in 
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try to clarify this grey area through the back door of the international 
criminal justice system, and it is my opinion that the International 
Criminal Court should avoid these murky waters. However, 
unresolved domestic debates over the War Powers Resolution run the 
risk of undermining the US posture in these diplomatic debates even 
as they weaken national resolve and undermine the efficiency of our 
deployed forces. The War Powers Resolution should be repealed and 
replaced with a more modern and flexible formulation that balances 
these important needs and helps to ensure a synergy between the 
coordinate branches of government and the forces in the field. 
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